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Despite the pervasiveness of markets in our lives, little is known about the role of user interfaces (UIs)
in promoting good decisions in market domains. How does the way we display market information to end
users, and the set of choices we offer, influence users’ decisions? In this paper, we introduce a new research
agenda on “market user interface design.” Our goal is to find the optimal market UI, taking into account
that users incur cognitive costs and are boundedly rational. Via lab experiments we systematically explore
the market UI design space, and we study the automatic optimization of market UIs given a behavioral
(quantal response) model of user behavior. Surprisingly, we find that the behaviorally-optimized UI performs
worse than the standard UI, suggesting that the quantal response model did not predict user behavior well.
Subsequently, we identify important behavioral factors that are missing from the user model, including loss
aversion and position effects, whichmotivates follow-up studies. Furthermore, we find significant differences
between individual users in terms of rationality. This suggests future research on personalized UI designs,
with interfaces that are tailored towards each individual user’s needs, capabilities, and preferences.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences–
Economics
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Market Design, UI Design, Behavioral Economics, Experiment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Electronic markets are becomingmore pervasive but a remaining research challenge is
to develop user interfaces (UIs) to promote effective outcomes for users. This is impor-
tant because markets often present users with a very large number of choices, making
it difficult for users to find the optimal choice. For example, the markets for digital
content which we can access via Amazon or iTunes are growing exponentially in size.
Soon, we will have to deal with many complex markets in unfamiliar domains, and
react to more frequent price changes. The smart grid domain is a prime example for
such a domain. As we are asked to make market decisions more and more frequently,
deliberation gets costly and we cannot spend too much time on individual decisions.
This is where Herb Simon’s 40-year old quote still says it best:
“...a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention...”
Herbert A. Simon (1971), pp. 40–41.
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Because humans incur cognitive costs when processing information [Miller 1956], a
wealth of information, or a wealth of choices in market environments makes attention
a scarce resource. Yet, traditional economic models assume agents to be perfectly ratio-
nal, with unlimited time and unbounded computational resources for deliberation. We
address this discrepancy by explicitly taking behavioral considerations into account
when designing market UIs. The same way that color-coded planes make the job of
an air-traffic controller easier, it is our goal to design market UIs that make economic
decision making easier, thereby improving social welfare. In this sense, our approach
is in line with the “choice architecture” idea put forward by Thaler et al. [2010].
A market UI can best be defined via two questions: first, what information is dis-
played to the user? Second, how many and which choices are offered to the user? Our
goal is to develop a computational method that finds the optimal market UI, given
a behavioral user model. Using behavioral models may lead to different market UIs
for multiple reasons. For example, taking into account that users make mistakes, it
may be best not to offer some choices that can lead to particularly bad outcomes (e.g.,
spending too much of your budget in one step). So far, the market design literature
has largely ignored the intersection of market design and UI design. We argue that
this intersection is particularly important because the complexity of the UI defines the
cognitive load imposed on users. Furthermore, the UI defines how, and how well, users
can express their preferences. Thus, when designing an electronic market, the design
of the market’s UI may be as important as the market’s economic design.
1.1. Overview of Results
This paper introduces a new research agenda on “market user interface design.” We
first present a systematic, empirical exploration of the effect that different UI designs
have on users’ performance in economic decision making. Then we study the automatic
optimization of market UIs based on a behavioral quantal response model.1 We situ-
ate our study in a hypothetical market for 3G bandwidth where users can select the
desired speed level, given different prices and values. While there is a possibly infinite
set of choices (possible speed levels), the market UI only exposes some finite number.
As the market UI designer, we get to decide how many and which choices to offer.
The participants of our experiments play a series of single-user games, facing a se-
quential decision-making problem with inter-temporal budget constraints. We vary a)
the number of choices offered to the users (3, 4, 5, or 6), b) whether prices are fixed or
dynamic, and c) whether choice sets are fixed or adaptive. Additionally, we also learn a
quantal response model based on parts of the experimental data, and use computation
to automatically optimize the market UI given the behavioral model. We then compare
the behaviorally optimized UI with a standard UI. Because the market UI has a finite
number of choices, the optimization algorithm must make a trade-off between having
some choices at the lower end of the speed levels (which may be the best choice when
values are low and prices are high) and some choices at the upper end (which may be
the best choice when values are high and prices are low). Our main results are:
(1) Users’ realized value increases as we increase the number of choices from 3 to 4 to
5, with no statistically significant difference between 5 and 6 choices.
(2) The realized value is higher with adaptive choice sets compared to fixed choice sets.
(3) The total realized value is lower when using the UI that is optimized for behavioral
play, compared to the UI that is optimized for perfectly-rational play.
1Due to space constraints, some aspects of our study are omitted in this version of the paper.
For more details, please see the appendix of the expanded version of this paper, available at:
www.ifi.uzh.ch/ce/publications/MarketUserInterfaceDesign.pdf.
The third result was particularly surprising and prompted a more detailed analysis
of users’ decisions. We find that the quantal response model was too simplistic with sig-
nificant negative consequences for market UI design. Our analysis suggests that we
omitted important behavioral factors like loss aversion and position effects. Further-
more, we identify large differences between individual users’ level of rationality. We
find that for the “less rational” users there was no statistically significant difference in
realized value using the UI optimized for rational play or optimized for behavioral play.
However, the more rational users suffered, because the UI optimization took away too
many of the valuable choices, making the decision problem easier, but reducing the
total realized value. Thus, this result points towards the need for personalized market
UIs that take into account each user’s individual level of rationality.
1.2. Related Work
Prior research has identified a series of behavioral effects in users’ decision making.
Buscher et al. [2010] show that the amount of visual attention users spend on differ-
ent parts of a web page depends on the task type and the quality of the information
provided. Dumais et al. [2010] show that these “gaze patterns” differ significantly from
user to user, suggesting that different UIs may be optimal for different groups of users.
In a study of the cognitive costs associated with decision making, Chabris et al. [2009]
show that users allocate time for a decision-making task according to cost-benefit prin-
ciples. Because time is costly, more complex UIs put additional costs on users.
In addition to UI complexity, emotional factors are also important in decision mak-
ing. Consider the “jam experiment” by Iyengar and Lepper [2000], which shows that
customers are happier with the choices they make when offered 6 different flavors of
jam compared to 24 different flavors. Schwartz [2005] identifies multiple reasons why
more choices can lead to decreased satisfaction, including regret,missed opportunities,
the curse of high expectations, and self blame. While emotional factors are important
in many domains, in this paper we do not aim to study them directly. Instead we focus
on users’ cognitive limitations and corresponding bounded rationality.
Some research on UIs for recommender systems addresses aspects related to our
work. Knijnenburg et al. [2012] study which factors explain the user experience of rec-
ommender systems. Chen and Pu [2010] propose methods for dynamically changing a
recommender system UI, based on user feedback, to help users find suitable products
in very large domains. Hauser et al. [2009] present a completely automated approach
for dynamically adapting user interfaces for virtual advisory websites. They are able
to infer users’ cognitive styles based on click-stream data and then adjust the look and
feel of a website accordingly. However, in contrast to our work, their goal is to increase
users’ purchase intentions, while our goal is to help users make better decisions.
Horvitz and Barry [1995] present a framework for the design of human-computer
interfaces for time-critical applications in non-market-based domains. Their method-
ology trades off the costs of cognitive burden with the benefits of added information.
Johnson et al. [1988] show that the way information is displayed (e.g., fractional vs.
decimal probability values) has an impact on user decision making. The authors briefly
discuss the implications of their findings for the design of information displays.
The work most closely related to ours is SUPPLE, introduced by Gajos et al. [2010],
who present a system that can automatically generate user interfaces that are adapted
to a person’s devices, tasks, preferences, and abilities. They formulate the UI genera-
tion as an optimization problem and find that automatically-generated UIs can lead
to significantly better performance compared to manufacturers’ defaults. While their
approach is in line with our goal of “automatic UI optimization,” they do not consider a
market context. They build a model of users’ pointing and dragging performance and
optimize their UIs for accuracy, speed of use, and users’ subjective preferences for UI
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) Mockup of the bandwidth market UI. (b) Screenshot of the market game used in the experiments.
layouts. In contrast, we build a behavioral user model and optimize for decision quality
in market environments where users are dealing with values, prices, and budgets.
In our own prior work [Seuken et al. 2010c], we have introduced the goal of designing
“hiddenmarkets” with simple and easy-to-use interfaces. In related work [Seuken et al.
2010a,b], we have presented a UI for a P2P backup market, demonstrating that it
is possible to hide many of the market’s complexities, while maintaining a market’s
efficiency. Similarly, Teschner and Weinhardt [2011] show that users of a prediction
market make better trades when using a simplified market interface, compared to one
that provides the maximum amount of information and trading options. This paper is
in the same vein as this prior work, but presents the first systematic exploration of the
market UI design space, thereby opening up a new field of empirical research.
2. THE BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION GAME
The experiments described in this paper were conducted as part of a larger user
study on people’s experiences and preferences regarding smartphone usage.2 The in-
ternational smartphone market is a Billion-dollar market with more than 100 Million
users worldwide. With an ever growing set of bandwidth-hungry applications on these
phones, the efficient allocation of 3G or 4G bandwidth is an important problem. Accord-
ing to Rysavy Research [2010], the demand for 3G bandwidth will continue to grow ex-
ponentially over the next few years and it will be infeasible for the network operators
to update their infrastructure fast enough to satisfy future demand. The common ap-
proach for addressing the problem of bandwidth demand temporarily exceeding supply
is to slow down every user in the network and to impose fixed data usage constraints.
Obviously, this introduces large economic inefficiencies because different users have
different values for high speed vs. low speed Internet access at different points in time.
Now imagine a hypothetical market-based solution to the 3G bandwidth problem.
The main premise is that users sometimes do tasks of high importance (e.g., send
an email attachment to their boss) and sometimes of low importance (e.g., random
browsing). If we assume that users are willing to accept low performance now for high
performance later, then we can optimize the allocation of bandwidth by shifting excess
2While future experiments will explore how our results translate to other domains, it is important to note
that the four design levers we study constitute within-experiment variations. Thus, any change in behavior
can be attributed to changes in the UI and are likely not specific to this domain.
demand to times of excess supply. Figure 1 (a) shows a mock-up application for such
a bandwidth market. Assume that at the beginning of the month each users gets 50
points, or tokens. As long as there is more supply than demand, a user doesn’t need
to spend his tokens. However, when there is excess demand and the user wants to go
online, then a screen pops up (as shown in Figure 1 (a)), requiring the user to make
a choice. Each speed level has a different price (in tokens). For simplicity, we assume
that when a user runs out of tokens, he gets no access or some very slow connection.3
This domain is particularly suitable to studying market UIs because we can easily
change many parameters of the UI, including the number of choices, whether prices
stay fixed or keep changing, and the particular composition of the choice set.
2.1. Game Design
Figure 1 (b) shows a screenshot of the market game we designed for our experiments,
mirroring the mockup of the market application, except that now the value for each
choice is no longer private to each user, but determined by the game. Note that this is
a single-user game on top of a simulated market domain. Each game has 6 rounds. At
the beginning of a game, a user has 30 tokens available to spend over the course of the
6 rounds. In each round, the user has to select one of the choices. Each choice (i.e., a
button in Figure 1 (b)) has three lines: the first line shows the speed of that choice in
KB/s. The second line shows the value of that choice in dollars. The value represents
the dollar amount that is added to a user’s scorewhen that choice is selected. The third
line shows the price of that choice in tokens. When the user selects a particular choice,
the corresponding number of tokens is subtracted from his budget and the correspond-
ing value is added to his score which is displayed in the top right corner of the window.
The score after the 6th round is the final score for the game.
Next to the score is a label displaying the user’s current budget, which always starts
at 30 in round 1 and then goes down as the user spends tokens. With the user’s budget
decreasing during a game, choices that have a price higher than the user’s current
budget become unavailable and are greyed out (as is the case for the top choice in
Figure 1 (b)). To the left of the user’s budget, the game shows the number of rounds
that are left until the game is over. Finally, at the very left of the window, we show the
user how much time he has left to make a decision in this particular round (e.g., in
Figure 1 (b) the user still has 5 seconds left to make a decision in the current round).4
In every round, the user is in one of three task categories (high importance, medium
importance, and low importance), which is displayed in the task category label. Ev-
ery round, one of these three categories is chosen randomly with probability 1/3. Note
that this corresponds to the original premise that users are doing tasks of different
importance at different points in time. The task category determines the values of all
choices. Effectively, the user has three concave value functions that map bandwidth
levels to values. Table I shows an overview of the values the user can expect in the
three categories for a game with 4 choices.5 As one would expect, selecting the higher
speed choices in the “high importance” category gives the user very high value, while
3In this paper, we do not concern ourselves with different businessmodels or market designs for this domain.
In particular, we do not address the question whether users should be allowed to pay money to buy more
tokens. We do not suggest that this particular business model of using a fixed number of tokens per month
should be adopted. Instead, we merely use this hypothetical market application as a motivating domain for
our experiments into market UI design.
4We put users under time pressure to induce a certain error rate which allows for a meaningful comparison
of different market UIs.
5The values shown in Table I are only the averages of the values in each category. In every round, the
actual value for each choice is perturbed upwards or downwards with probability 1/3, to introduce additional
stochasticity in the game. This avoids that users can memorize a fixed set of values for each task category.
Table I. The Values in the 3 different Task Categories
High Imp. Medium Imp. Low Imp
900 KB/s $1.7 $1.1 $0.4
300 KB/s $0.5 $0.2 - $0.2
100 KB/s -$0.3 - $0.3 - $0.5
0 KB/s - $1 - $0.9 - $0.8
choosing low speeds in the high importance category leads to a severe penalty. In con-
trast, in the “low importance” category the user can earn less value for selecting high
speeds, but is also penalized less for selecting the lowest speed.
The user’s problem when playing the game is to allocate the budget of 30 tokens
optimally over 6 rounds, not knowing which categories and values he will face in the
future. In some of our experiments, we randomly vary the prices charged for each
of the choices from round to round. Thus, the user may also have uncertainty about
which price level (out of 3 possible price levels) he will be facing next. This problem
constitutes a sequential decision making problem under uncertainty.6
2.2. MDP Formulation and Q-Values
Each game can formally be described as a finite-horizon Markov Decision Problem
(MDP) without discounting:
—State Space: CurrentRound × CurrentBudget × CurrentCategory × CurrentValue-
Variation × CurrentPriceLevel.
—Actions: Each choice affordable in the current round given current budget.
—Reward Function: The value of each choice.
—State Transition: The variables CurrentRound, CurrentBudget, and CurrentScore
transition deterministically given the selected choice. The other variables Current-
Category, CurrentValueVariation and CurrentPriceLevel transition stochastically.
The largest games we consider have approximately 7 million state-action pairs. Us-
ing dynamic programming, we can solve games of this size quickly (in less than 20
seconds). Thus, we can compute the optimal MDP policy, and we always know exactly
which choice is best for each possible situation (game state) that can arise. Note that
this policy is, of course, computed assuming that the future states are not known; only
the model and the transition probabilities as described above are known.
Solving the MDP involves the computation of the Q-values for each state-action pair.
For every state s and action a, the Q-valueQ(s, a) denotes the expected value for taking
action a in state s, and following the optimal MDP policy for every subsequent round.
Thus, the optimal action in each state is the action with the highest Q-value, and by
comparing the differences between the Q-values of two actions, we have a measure of
how much “worse in expectation” an action is, compared to the optimal action.
2.3. The Quantal-Response Model
A well-known theory from behavioral economics asserts that agents are more likely to
make errors the smaller the cost for making that error. This can be modeled formally
with the quantal response model ([McKelvey and Palfrey 1995]) which predicts the
likelihood that a user chooses action ai in state s to be:
P (ai | s) =
eλ·Q(s,ai)
∑n−1
j=0 e
λ·Q(s,aj)
6Note that to play the game optimally, the user only needs to know the values and the prices of each choice,
but not the speeds. However, we also include the speed information to label the buttons such that it is easier
for users to recognize what has changed in the current round (e.g., values and/or prices).
where n denotes the total number of actions, Q(s, ai) denotes the Q-value of action ai
in state s, and λ ≥ 0 is a precision parameter indicating how sensitive users are to dif-
ferences between Q-values. λ = 0 corresponds to random action selection, and λ = ∞
corresponds to perfectly-rational action selection, i.e., always choosing the optimal ac-
tion. Based on experimental results, one can compute a maximum-likelihood estimate
for λ, i.e., maximizing the likelihood of the observed data. Equipped with a particular
λ, this constitutes a user model which we use to optimize the UI for behavioral play
(see [Wright and Leyton-Brown 2010] for a comparison of behavioral models).
3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
Before we discuss the experiment design, let’s briefly pause to understand what exactly
is within the control of the market UI designer, and what is not. Remember that in
theory, there is an infinite set of choices (possible speed levels), but we assume that
any market UI can only expose a fixed number of choices to the user. The UI designer
decides 1) how many choices and 2) which exact choices to offer. For example, as in
Figure 1 (b), we can provide 4 choices, i.e., 0 KB/s, 100 KB/s, 300 KB/s, and 900 KB/s.
Alternatively, we can provide 3 choices, for example 0 KB/s, 500 KB/s, and 1000 KB/s.
Note that by picking the choices, we only choose the market interface; the user’s value
function which maps speed levels to values doesn’t change. Of course, higher speed
levels have higher value for the user, but they also have a higher price.
In addition to the constraint of having a fixed number of choices, we also require
the choice set to be fixed ex-ante and stay fixed throughout a game. In particular,
the choices cannot depend on the state of the game (round, budget, category, value
variation, price level).7 In fact, the UI remains fixed for the 10 to 15 games that users
play per treatment. For example, in the treatment with 5 choices, the user gets the
same 5 choices in every round. Of course, in each of the possibly millions of different
game states, a different choice is optimal. If the user could choose his speed freely,
perhaps the optimal speed in some state would be 378 KB/s. But our UIs only offer a
fixed number of choices. Of course, despite this constraint, for every state in the game,
one of the available choices is still the best, and by solving the MDP we knowwhich one
it is. But in the real world, a UI designer would also only get to pick one UI (possibly
knowing a distribution over situations a user will be in). We as the experimenters
adopt the same viewpoint: we select one fixed UI, knowing the distribution of game
states that a user will encounter, but we cannot change the UI during a game.
3.1. Design Levers
We study the following fourmarket UI design levers:
(1) Number of Choices: This design lever describes how many choices (i.e., the num-
ber of buttons) were available to the users (3, 4, 5, or 6).
(2) Fixed vs. Dynamic Prices: In the fixed price treatment, each choice always costs
a fixed number of tokens (2 tokens per 100KB/s). With dynamic prices, one of 3 price
levels is chosen randomly with probability 1/3 in each round, where the price per
100 KB/s is either 1, 2, or 3 tokens (thus, 500KB/s cost either 5, 10, or 15 tokens).8
(3) Fixed vs. Adaptive Choice Sets: In the fixed choice set treatment, the users al-
ways have the same set of choices available to them in every round (e.g., always 0
KB/s, 100 KB/s, 300 KB/s, and 900KB/s). In the adaptive choice set treatment, the
7With the exception of the Adaptive Choice Set treatment, where we specify not one but three different UIs,
one for each category (i.e., high, medium, low).
8The motivation for testing this design lever is that in some domains, balancing supply and demand may
be possible with other means than dynamic prices. However, a detailed discussion of this idea is beyond the
scope of this paper. We also don’t present results regarding this particular design lever in this paper.
decision within the UI design as to which choices to offer is allowed to vary with the
category (e.g., in the high category, more high speed choices are available; in the low
category, more low speed choices are available).
(4) Rational vs. Behavioral UI Optimization: This describes which method is used
to determine the composition of the choice sets (i.e., fixing the number of choices,
which particular speed levels are available to users). In the Rational-Optimization
treatment, the choice sets are optimized based on the MDP model assuming per-
fectly rational play. In the Behavioral-Optimization treatment, the choice sets are
optimized assuming behavioral play according to the quantal response model.
3.2. Methodology and Experimental Set-up
We recruited 53 participants (27 men, 26 women) from the Seattle area with non-
technical jobs. All participants had at least a Bachelors degree and we excluded par-
ticipants who majored in computer science, economics, statistics, math, or physics.
They were fluent English speakers, had normal (20/20) or corrected-to-normal vision,
and were all right-handed. All of them used a computer for at least 5 hours per week.
Their median age was 39, ranging from 22 to 54. None of the participants worked for
the same company, but all of them had some familiarity with smartphones. We ran
one participant at a time with each session lasting about 1.5 hours. The users first
filled out a pre-study questionnaire (5 minutes). Then they went through a training
session where the researcher first explained all the details of the game and gave them
the opportunity to play 12 training games (20 minutes). Then they participated in the
experiment (55 minutes) and finally completed a post-study survey (10 minutes). The
participants were compensated in two ways. First, they received a software gratuity
that was independent of their performance (users could choose one item from a list of
Microsoft software products). Second, they received an Amazon gift card via email with
an amount equal to the total score they had achieved over the course of all games they
had played. The expected score for a random game, assuming perfect play, was around
$1. With random action selection, the expected score was highly negative. After each
game, we showed the user his score from the last game and his accumulated score over
all games played so far.9 The final gift card amounts of the 53 users varied between
$4.60 and $43.70, with a median amount of $24.90.
3.3. Time Limits
To study the effect of the UI design on a user’s ability to make economic decisions we
need a reasonably complex decision problem, such that it is neither too easy nor too
difficult for users to find the optimal decision. We achieve this by making decision time
a scarce resource, as prior research has shown that users make worse decisions when
under time pressure [Gabaix et al. 2006]. We impose an exogenous time limit of 12
(7) seconds per round. If a user doesn’t make a choice within this time limit, the lowest
choice (with 0KB/s for 0 tokens and a highly negative value) is chosen, and the game
transitions to the next round. The time resets in every round. To warn the user, the
game starts beeping three seconds before the end of a round.
In addition to the games with a fixed time limit, the users also played a series of
games with an endogenous time limit. They had 240 seconds to play many games
repeatedly; once a user finished one game, there was a 15 second break, and then the
next game started. Thus, the cost for spending more time on a decision was internal-
9Originally, we had 56 participants in our study, but we had to exclude 3 participants from the first exper-
iment (2 males, 1 female) because they did not understand the game well enough and achieved a negative
overall score. However, we performed all regression analyses with and without those 3 users, and obtained
qualitatively similar results.
Table II. Design of Experiment 1. Each participant played between 40 and 50
games. The design lever Number of Choices was a within-subject factor, the
design lever Fixed vs. Dynamic Prices was a between-subjects factor.
Number Of Choices 12-second game 7-second game 240-second game
3 4 × 4 × 1 ×
4 4 × 4 × 1 ×
5 4 × 4 × 1 ×
6 4 × 4 × 1 ×
Table III. Design of Experiment 2. Every participant played between 40 and 50 games. Both design levers
Fixed vs. Adaptive Choice Sets and UI Optimization were within-subject factors.
Treatment Variation 12-second game 7-second game 240-second game
Fixed Choice Sets & Rational Optimization 4 × 4 × 1 ×
Adaptive Choice Sets & Rational Optimization 4 × 4 × 1 ×
Fixed Choice Sets & Behavioral Optimization 4 × 4 × 1 ×
Adaptive ChoiceSets & Rational Optimization 4 × 4 × 1 ×
ized by the participants. We used this time treatment to study the effect of fixed vs.
dynamic prices on decision time. However, we do not discuss this aspect in this paper.
3.4. Treatment Variations
The study was split into two separate experiments. Experiment 1 involved 35 par-
ticipants, and we tested the design levers Number of Choices (within-subject factor)
and Fixed vs. Dynamic Prices (between-subject factor). Table II depicts the experiment
design for each individual user. We randomized the order in which the users played
the games with 3, 4, 5, or 6 choices. For each of those treatments, every user started
with the four 12-second games, then played the four 7-second games, and then the
240-second endogenous time game. In Experiment 2 we had 18 participants and we
tested the design levers Fixed vs. Adaptive Choice Sets and Rational vs. Behavioral UI
Optimization (both within-subject factors). Here, all games had four choices and dy-
namic prices. See Table III for a depiction of the experiment design for each individual
participant. Again, we randomized the order of the treatments.
3.5. Computational UI Optimization
To allow for a fair comparison of different market UIs (e.g., one with 4 choices vs. one
with 5 choices), we chose each of these UIs optimally, given the constraints imposed
by the treatment. The only choice that was always included was the 0 KB/s choice (for
0 tokens). Here, “optimally” means that we selected the one fixed UI with the highest
ExpectedOptimalValue given the underlying market model (i.e., distribution of game
states). To make this optimization computationally feasible, we discretized the search
space, with 100KB/s being the smallest unit. Our search algorithm took as input the
design parameters (e.g., 3 choices and optimized for rational play), iterated through
all possible combinations of choices (i.e., all possible combinations of speed levels),
solved the resulting MDP for each combination, and output the UI with the highest
ExpectedOptimalValue. The optimization algorithm makes a trade-off between having
some choices at the lower end of the speed levels (e.g., 200 KB/s which may be the best
choice when values are low and prices are high) and some choices at the upper end of
the speed levels (e.g., 900 KB/s which may be the best choice when values are high and
prices are low). Note that this means that for a particular game state, the “optimal”
choice for that state will not always be among the set of offered choices. Using this UI
optimization approach, we guarantee that for every particular set of design criteria,
we present the user with the best possible UI given the constraints.
3.6. Hypotheses
The larger the number of choices, the higher the expected value of the game assuming
optimal play. Yet, Malhotra [1982] has shown that information overload leads to poorer
decisions. We hypothesized that at first the benefit from having more choices out-
weighs the additional cognitive load (H1), but that as the number of choices gets large,
the added cognitive costs become the dominant factor (H2). Similarly, using Adaptive-
ChoiceSets tailors the available choices to the particular task category, which should
make the decision easier for the user. On the other hand, the fact that the choices may
change from round to round might also make it harder for users to find the optimal
one. We hypothesized that the overall effect is positive (H3). Finally, the behavioral
optimization eliminates some choices that may be useful in some game states because
the behavioral model deems them as too risky. Thus, a user might suffer without those
choices, or he might benefit, because the risky choices are eliminated. We hypothesized
that the overall effect is positive (H4). To summarize, our four hypotheses are:
H1: The realized value increases as we increase the number of choices.
H2: The realized value first increases as we increase the number of choices,
but ultimately decreases.
H3: The realized value is higher when using adaptive choice sets, compared
to using fixed choice sets.
H4: The realized value is higher when using behavioral optimization, com-
pared to using rational optimization.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we describe the results regarding our hypotheses. As the regres-
sion technique we use Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE), an extension of
generalized linear models that allows for the analysis of correlated observations
[Nelder and Wedderburn 1972]. This gives us consistent coefficient estimates with ro-
bust standard errors despite using repeated measures from individual users.
4.1. Number of Choices
The first design lever we analyze is NumberOfChoices. We measure the effect of
this design lever by analyzing the dependent variable RealizedValue, which is a
randomness-adjusted version of the user’s total score. Consider first the graph in
Figure 2. While the top line, representing ExptectedOptimalValue, monotonically in-
creases as the number of choices is increased, the bottom line, representing Realized-
Value, only increases as we go from 3 to 4 to 5 choices, but then slightly decreases as we
go from 5 to 6 choices (with largely overlapping error bars). One possible explanation
is that the disadvantage from adding cognitive load as we go from 5 to 6 choices out-
weighs the theoretical benefits of having one more choice available. For more insights,
we now turn to the statistical data analysis.
Consider column (1) of the table in Figure 3 where we present the results of the re-
gression analysis with indicator variables for the different treatments. The coefficients
for NumChoices are with respect to NumChoices=6. We see that the effects of Num-
Choices=3 and NumChoices=4 are statistically significant at p < 0.001. Furthermore,
the coefficient forNumChoices=5 is positive, but not statistically significant. Thus, the
data does not provide enough evidence that there is also a statistically significant de-
crease in RealizedValue as we go from 5 to 6 choices. In column (2) of the table in
Figure 3, we add more covariates to the analysis to test the robustness of the results.
We see that dynamicPrices has a statistically significant effect on the realized value,
Fig. 2. Mean values for 3, 4, 5, and 6 choices. The blue
line (on top) corresponds to ExpectedOptimalValue.
The green line (on the bottom) corresponds to Real-
izedValue.
Fig. 3. GEE for the dependent variable Realized
Value, studying the effect of NumChoices. Stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses under the
coefficients. The individual coefficient is statisti-
cally significant at the *10%level, the **5% level,
the ***1% level, and at the ****0.1% level.
Factors/Covariates (1) (2)
Intercept
0.549**** 0.610****
(0.0374) (0.0605)
NumChoices=3
-0.176**** -0.177****
(0.0451) (0.0451)
NumChoices=4
-0.102**** -0.108****
(0.0275) (0.0283)
NumChoices=5
0.018 0.021
(0.0286) (0.0309)
NumChoices=6
0 0
DynamicPrices=0
-0.169****
(0.0396)
7-SecondGame
-0.012
(0.0236)
GameCounter
0.001
(0.0010)
Model Fit (QICC) 149.743 147.719
while the covariates 7-secondGame (controlling for whether it was a 7-second or a 12-
second game) and GameCounter (controlling for possible learning effects) do not have
a statistically significant effect. While adding those covariates, the results regarding
NumChoices remain qualitatively unchanged. Thus, we obtain the following results:
RESULT 1 (NUMBER OF CHOICES). We reject the null hypothesis in favor of H1, i.e.,
the realized value per game significantly increases as we increase the number of avail-
able choices from 3 to 4 to 5. Regarding H2, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, i.e., we
don’t have enough evidence to conclude whether the realized value per game ultimately
plateaus or decreases as we increase the number of available choices further.
4.2. Fixed vs. Adaptive Choice Sets
We now move on to the analysis of the data from Experiment 2 where we studied the
two design levers Fixed vs. Adaptive Choice Sets, and UIOptimization. For this exper-
iment, we fixed the number of available choices to four and only considered dynamic
prices. Due to space constraints we cannot discuss the details of the design lever Fixed
vs. Adaptive Choice Sets. Here, we only state the final result which we obtain from the
regression analysis presented in Table IV:
RESULT 2 (FIXED VS. ADAPTIVE CHOICE SETS). We reject the null hypothesis in
favor of H3, i.e., the realized value is significantly higher with adaptive choice sets,
compared to fixed choice sets.
4.3. UI Optimization for Rational vs. Behavioral Play
For the design lever UIOptimization we compare two different UIs, one optimized for
perfectly rational play, and one optimized for behavioral play. For the behavioral op-
timization, we first built a behavioral model based on the data from experiment 1.
We computed different likelihood-maximizing λ-parameters for the quantal response
model depending on 1) the total number of choices in the particular game, 2) the num-
ber of choices left in a particular round, and 3) whether prices were fixed or dynamic.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4. (a) Market UI Optimization Method. (b) A sample UI optimized assuming perfectly rational play. (c)
A sample UI optimized assuming behavioral play.
Then we solved the resulting MDP, where now Q-values are computed assuming that
the user will follow the “behavioral strategy” when playing the game. Finally, we se-
lected the UI with the highest expected value according to this “behavioral MDP.” Fig-
ure 4 (a) shows a diagram illustrating our market UI optimization methodology.
To get some intuition for what happens under behavioral optimization, consider Fig-
ures 4 (b) and (c) where we display two sample UIs, one optimized for perfectly ra-
tional play, and one optimized for behavioral play. Note that both UIs are the result
of a computational search algorithm. The only difference between the two UIs is the
top choice: the UI that was optimized for perfectly rational play gives the user the
900KB/s choice, while the UI that was optimized for behavioral play gives the user the
400KB/s choice. This result is understandable in light of how the UI optimization algo-
rithm works and the behavioral vs. optimal user model. The quantal response model
assigns each action a certain likelihood of being chosen, corresponding to the Q-values
of those actions. Now, consider the top choice in Figure 4 (b), which has a high value,
but which can also cost between 9 and 27 tokens (this is a game with dynamic prices).
Thus, in the worst case, the user spends 27 out of his 30 tokens with one click, and
then has only 3 tokens left for the remaining 5 rounds. Even if it is very unlikely that
the user selects this action, the negative effect of an occasional mistake would be very
large. Consequently, the UI optimized for behavioral play shown in Figure 4 (c) does
not have such high-value high-cost choices, reducing the negative effect of mistakes.
Now, consider Table IV for the effect of BehavioralOptimization on RealizedValue.
We see that the coefficient for BehavioralOptimization is negative and statistically
significant (p < 0.001).10 Thus, the UI optimization assuming behavioral play had a
negative effect on RealizedValue and we obtain the following result:
RESULT 3 (UI OPTIMIZATION). We cannot reject the null hypothesis in favor of H4.
Instead, we find that using the behaviorally optimized UI leads to a realized value
which is not higher but in fact significantly lower, compared to using the UI optimized
for rational play.
10We also performed this analysis separately for i) fixed choices sets, and ii) adaptive choice sets. The effect
of the behavioral optimization is negative in both cases, however, it is only statistically significant when
using adaptive choice sets.
Table IV. GEE for dependent variable Re-
alizedValue, studying AdaptiveChoiceSets
and BehavioralOptimization.
Factors/Covariates (1)
Intercept
0.462****
(0.0501)
AdaptiveChoiceSets?
0.077**
(0.0376)
BehavioralOptimization?
-0.111****
(0.0334)
Model Fit (QICC) 106.927
Table V. GEE for dependent variable OptChoice, studying Lambda
and QvalueDiff. Standard errors are given in parentheses under the
coefficients. The individual coefficient is statistically significant at the
*10% level, the **5% level, the ***1% level, and at the ****0.1% level.
Factors (1) (2)
B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Intercept
-0.816**** 0.442**** -1.529**** 0.217****
(0.1408) (0.1593)
Lambda
0.150**** 1.162**** 0.161**** 1.175****
(0.0180) (0.0197)
QvalueDiff
5.868**** 353.713****
(0.4353)
Fit (QICC) (3771.953) (3589.063)
This result is very surprising, in particular because the behavioral UI optimization
had a negative instead of a positive effect on RealizedValue. Upon finding this result,
we hypothesized that the quantal response model was too simple for a UI optimization,
ignoring some important behavioral factors. Given prior behavioral research, possible
candidate factors were loss aversion and position effects. The goal of the analysis in
the next section is to find empirical support for our hypothesis that behavioral factors
which we omitted in our UI optimization had a significant impact on users’ decisions.
5. BEHAVIORAL DECISION ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze individual rounds of a game to understand which factors
influence users’ decision making. Here, we only consider the data from 7-second games
from experiment 1. We primarily analyze the dependent variable OptChoice, which is
1 if the user clicked on the optimal choice in a particular round, and 0 otherwise.
5.1. Degree of Rationality
We first test whether individual users exhibit significant differences in their play ac-
cording to the quantal response model. We compute a separate maximum-likelihood
parameter λi for each user i. This parameter can be seen as measuring how “rational”
a user’s play was. In fact, the users exhibited large differences, with a minimum λ of
3.9, a maximum of 9.0, and a median of 6.8. Table V presents the regression results
for OptChoice. In column (1), we see that the parameter Lambda has a statistically
significant effect (p < 0.001). Looking at the odds ratio (Exp(B)), we see that the odds
of choosing the optimal choice are 16% higher for a user with λ = x compared to a user
with λ = x− 1.11 Thus, for the analysis of OptChoice it is important to control for λ.
5.2. Q-Value Differences
We now analyze the factor QvalueDiff which denotes the difference between the Q-
values of the best and second-best action. In column (2) in Table V we see that Qval-
ueDiff is statistically significant (p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 354. Note that this
is the odds ratio for a one unit change in the Q-value difference. Yet, in our data, the
mean of the Q-value difference is 0.11. The odds ratio for a change of 0.1 is 1.8. Thus,
holding Lambda constant, if the Q-value difference between the best and second-best
choice increases by 0.1, the odds for choosing the optimal choice increase by 80%.
11We also analyzed two other user-specific factors: Age and Gender. There was no statistically significant
effect of Age on either OptChoice or RealizedValue. For Gender, there was no effect with respect to Realized-
Value, but there was a small statistically significant effect (p < 0.1) on Optchoice: female users were slightly
more likely to miss the optimal choice, but male users made bigger mistakes when they missed the optimal
choice. However, the factor Lambda already captures user-specific cognitive differences, and thus we do not
need to also control for Gender in the regression analyses.
Table VI. GEE for dependent variable OptChoice, studying UI complexity, position effects, and loss aversion.
Standard errors are given in parentheses under the coefficients. The individual coefficient is statistically significant
at the *10% level, the **5% level, the ***1% level, and at the ****0.1% level.
Factors/Covariates (1) (2) (3)
B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Intercept
0.283 1.327 -0.495* 0.610* -0.616*** 0.540***
(0.2182) (0.2489) (0.2339)
Lambda
0.167**** 1.181**** 0.162**** 1.176**** 0.158**** 1.171****
(0.0206) (0.0223) (0.0238)
QvalueDiff
5.062**** 157.888**** 4.421**** 83.196**** 4.595**** 98.962****
(0.4297) (0.5061) (0.4989)
NumChoices
-0.391**** 0.677**** -0.087* 0.916* -0.065 0.937
(0.0446) (0.0487) (0.0583)
OptRelativeRank=5
-3.853**** 0.021**** -4.046**** 0.017****
(0.9808) (1.0396)
OptRelativeRank=4
-1.893**** 0.151**** -1.853**** 0.157****
(0.4499) (0.4959)
OptRelativeRank=3
-1.201**** 0.301**** -1.188**** 0.305****
(0.2706) (0.3382)
OptRelativeRank=2
-0.614** 0.541** -0.522 0.593
(0.2807) (0.3351)
OptRelativeRank=1
-0.160 0.852 -0.170 0.844
(0.2283) (0.2512)
OptRelativeRank=0
0 1 0 1
OptimalChoiceNegative=1
-1.299**** 0.273****
(0.2247)
CurrentCategory=2
1.532**** 4.626****
(0.2059)
CurrentCategory=1
0.033 1.034
(0.1295)
CurrentCategory=0
0 1
Goodness of Fit (QICC) 3476.044 3345.116 3288.243
5.3. UI Design: Number of Choices
We now study how the UI design affects users’ ability to make optimal choices. Con-
sider Table VI column (1), where we add NumChoices to the regression. This factor
denotes the number of choices in the game (i.e., 3, 4, 5, or 6 choices). We see that the
factor has a large and highly statistically negative effect (p < 0.001) on OptChoice.
Holding all other factors constant, increasing the number of choices by 1 reduces the
odds for selecting the optimal choice by 32%. Naturally, a more complex UI (i.e., more
choices) makes it harder for users to find the optimal choice.12
5.4. Incomplete Search: Position Effects
By design, the game exhibits a strong ordering effect: the values of the choices decrease
monotonically from top to bottom, as do the prices. Thus, it is conceivable that users
scan the choices in a linear way, either from top to bottom or from bottom to top. Given
that they are under time pressure, incomplete search effects may be expected, and
prior research has shown that this can lead to significant position effects [Dumais et al.
2010; Buscher et al. 2010]. We can control for positional effects by adding information
about the position of the optimal choice to the regression. Consider column (2) in Table
VI where we added six indicator variables to the regression. OptRelativeRank denotes
12We also analyzed NumChoicesLeft which denotes the number of choices that were still affordable during
a game situation, given the prices of the current choices and the user’s budget. However, when controlling
for NumChoices we found that NumChoicesLeft does not have a statistically significant effect on OptChoice.
Table VII. UI optimization: Effects on optimal and realized value.
Behavioral Optimization? Optimal Value Realized Value
no 1.02 0.50
yes 0.78 0.39
the “relative rank” or “relative position” of the optimal choice, taking into account the
currently unavailable choices. Consider a game with 6 choices as an example. If there
are currently 4 choices left and the optimal choice is the third from the top, then the
absolute position of that choice would be 2, but the relative rank is 0.13
In column (2) of Table VI we see that OptRelativeRank has a very strong, and highly
statistically significant negative effect onOptChoice. Note that all coefficient estimates
are relative to OptRelativeRank=0. The lower the rank of the optimal choice, the less
likely the users were to choose the optimal action. As we go from OptRelativeRank=0
to OptRelativeRank=5, the coefficients decrease monotonically, and except for OptRel-
ativeRank=1, all of the effects are statistically significant. Compared to the case when
the optimal choice has rank 0, holding everything else constant, if OptRelativeRank=4
the odds of choosing the optimal action decrease by 84%, and if OptRelativeRank=5,
the odds decrease by 98%. Thus, in particular for the very low ranks, the position effect
is indeed very strong and highly statistically significant (p < 0.001), and because our
user model did not take it into account, this presents a possible explanation for why
the UI optimization failed.
5.5. Loss Aversion
Loss-aversion, i.e., people’s tendency to avoid losses more than they appreciate gains,
is a well-known effect in behavioral economics [Tversky and Kahneman 1991]. Thus
we hypothesized to find it in our data as well. Consider column (3) of Table VI where
we added OptimalChoiceNegative to the regression, an indicator variable that is 1
when the value of the optimal choice is negative, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we also
added the factor CurrentCategory to the regression, controlling for the different value
distributions in different game situations.OptimalChoiceNegativehas a large negative
coefficient, and is statistically significant (p < 0.001). Thus, whether the optimal choice
has a positive or negative value makes a large difference on users’ behavior, providing
strong evidence for the loss aversion hypothesis.14
6. TOWARDS PERSONALIZED MARKET USER INTERFACES
We have seen that behavioral factors such as position effects and loss aversion play a
significant role in users’ decision making, offering potential answers to the question
why the UI optimization failed. We now come back to the design leverUI Optimization
that we studied in experiment 2. In further analyses ofOptChoice (not presented here),
we find that the behavioral UI optimization indeed made the decision problem easier
for the users: they were 17% more likely to select the optimal choice when using the
UI optimized for behavioral play. Given that the users made better choices but their
RealizedValue still decreased, this suggests that the UI optimization eliminated too
many valuable choices. In some sense, it was “too aggressive”.
13 We have also performed the same analyses using absolute rank and obtained qualitatively similar results.
14Note that this loss aversion effect cannot be explained with classical risk aversion, which is based on di-
minishing marginal utility of wealth [Koeszegi and Rabin 2007]. In our games, users repeatedly face many
small-scale risks with almost no effect on their overall wealth. Thus, risk aversion is not a convincing expla-
nation for the observed behavior. Another possible explanation for the observed effect could be myopia. It is
conceivable that users have a limited look-ahead horizon when making decisions during the game, and thus
do not fully account for the effect of running out of budget towards the end of the game. However, in further
statistical analyses we could not find evidence for this hypothesis.
Table VIII. GEE for dependent variable Real-
izedValue for SmallLambda=0, studying the
effect of BehavioralOptimization.
Factors/Covariates (1)
Intercept
0.360****
(0.0331)
Lambda
0.048****
(0.0068)
AdaptiveChoices=1
0.061
(0.0424)
BehavioralOptimization=1
-0.172****
(0.0371)
Model Fit (QICC) 30.050
Table IX. GEE for dependent variable Real-
izedValue for SmallLambda=1 studying the
effect of BehavioralOptimization.
Factors/Covariates (1)
Intercept
-0.308****
(0.0377)
Lambda
0.186****
(0.0094)
AdaptiveChoices=1
0.099*
(0.0572)
BehavioralOptimization=1
-0.068
(0.0495)
Model Fit (QICC) 74.808
Now consider Table VII, which shows what happened to OptimalValue and Real-
izedValue under the behavioral optimization. By using the behavioral optimization,
we decreased the optimal value (achievable for a perfectly rational player) from $1.02
to $0.78. Thus, we “took away” approximately $0.24 per game. Note that we never
expected the users to come even close to the optimal values, but instead we expected
them to do better using the behaviorally optimized UI such that the Realized Value
would actually increase. However, as we can see in the last column of Table VII, the
Realized Value also dropped from $0.50 to $0.39. Relative to the optimal value, the
users did better in the re-optimized game – but in absolute terms they did worse.
A potential explanation is that by coincidence, the users in experiment 2 acted “more
rationally” than the users in experiment 1. However, the best fitting λ-parameters for
experiments 1 and 2 are very similar, and thus, the data does not support this hy-
pothesis. Yet, we found another unexpected result regarding users’ level of rationality
in experiment 2. As before, we computed a λi-parameter for each user, as well as one
λ corresponding to the best fit across all users. Next, we computed a binary variable
SmallLambda for each user which denotes whether that user’s λi is smaller or larger
than the average λ. Thus, SmallLambda denotes whether a user belongs to the more
rational or to the less rational group of users.
Now consider Tables VIII and IX, where we study the effect of BehavioralOptimiza-
tion on RealizedValue, separating users into the more rational users (on the left) and
the less rational users (on the right). For SmallLambda=0 (the more rational users),
the effect of BehavioralOptimization is particularly negative: for those users we made
the game a lot worse by doing the re-optimization. However, for SmallLambda=1 (the
less rational users) the effect of BehavioralOptimization is close to zero, and not sta-
tistically significant. Thus, for less rational users, the behaviorally-optimized UI was
easier to use, but the resulting RealizedValue was practically the same.
This finding suggests a new research direction on personalized market user inter-
faces, with the goal to tailor the UI to the capabilities, needs, and preferences of
individual users. To achieve this, we must access user-specific, behavioral and non-
behavioral data. This is available in many domains, in particular in the smartphone
domain. Once we have an estimate of a user’s “degree of rationality,” we can provide
each user with a market UI that is specifically optimized for that particular user.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a new research agenda on market user interface de-
sign. Our long-term goal is to understand how UI design choices for markets affect
users’ abilities to make good economic decisions, and how we can develop automated
methods to optimize market UIs. In studying this question, it is crucial to take a be-
havioral approach, deviating from a perfectly rational agent model. Thus, our research
explores a design space in which human limited cognition meets computing.
We ran a behavioral economics lab experiment, testing the effect of different market
UI design levers. In regard to the number of choices, we found that the realized value
increases as we go from 3 to 4 to 5 choices, with no significant effect going from 5 to 6
choices. In future experiments we will also test 7 and 8 choices, to see if the realized
value ultimately decreases again. For the design lever Fixed vs. Adaptive Choice Sets,
we found that the realized value is significantly higher with adaptive choice sets.
Finally, the most interesting design lever was the behavioral UI optimization. An
unexpected result is that the realized value was lower when using the behavioral UI
optimization. This suggests that the quantal response model was too simplistic to ac-
curately predict user behavior. In future research, we will consider other behavioral
models that are better supported by neuroeconomic experiments like the drift-diffusion
model [Fehr and Rangel 2011]. In a subsequent decision analysis, we found that our
model ignored important behavioral factors like loss aversion and position effects. Yet,
the most intriguing result concerns how less rational and more rational users differed
regarding the effect of the UI optimization. While there was no significant difference
regarding the realized value for the less rational users, the more rational users lost a
lot of value in the UI optimization due to precluded opportunities. This result points
towards the need to estimate each individual user’s level of rationality based on behav-
ioral data obtained over time, to generate personalized market UIs. Taking this idea
a step further, we can also take a user’s value for time into account. Thus, there are
still many opportunities for research at the intersection of market design, intelligent
agents, UI design, and behavioral economics, ranging from better behavioral models,
to algorithms for learning user preferences and automated UI optimization.
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